



Foreign Policy -- Defense -- Documents on the web -- December 2009

GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS:

The White House

REMARKS:

REMARKS BY PRESIDENT OBAMA AND PRIME MINISTER SINGH OF INDIA IN JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE

The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. East Room. November 24, 2009.

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-singh-india-joint-press-conference>

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT AFTER MEETING WITH HIS CABINET ON NATIONAL SECURITY, THE BUDGET, HEALTH CARE, AND THE ECONOMY

The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. Cabinet Room. November 23, 2009.

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-after-meeting-with-his-cabinet-0>

REMARKS BY PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA AND PRESIDENT LEE MYUNG-BAK OF REPUBLIC OF KOREA IN JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE

The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. Blue House, Seoul, South Korea. November 19, 2009.

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-and-president-lee-myung-bak-republic-korea-joint-pre>

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT IN A BILATERAL MEETING WITH PREMIER WEN JIABAO OF CHINA

The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. Diaoyutai State Guesthouse, Beijing, China. November 18, 2009.

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-a-bilateral-meeting-with-premier-wen-jiabao-china>

REMARKS BY PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA AT TOWN HALL MEETING WITH FUTURE CHINESE LEADERS

The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. Museum of Science and Technology, Shanghai, China. November 16, 2009.

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-town-hall-meeting-with-future-chinese-leaders>

REMARKS BY PRESIDENT OBAMA AND PRESIDENT YUDHOYONO OF INDONESIA AFTER BILATERAL MEETING

The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. Shangri-La Hotel, Singapore.
November 15, 2009.

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-obama-and-president-yudhoyono-indonesia-after-bilateral-meeting>

REMARKS BY PRESIDENT OBAMA AND PRIME MINISTER ABHISIT OF THAILAND AFTER ASEAN-10 MEETING

The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. Shangri-La Hotel, Singapore.
November 15, 2009.

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-vejajiva-thailand-after-asean-10-meetin>

REMARKS BY PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA AND PRIME MINISTER YUKIO HATOYAMA OF JAPAN IN JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE

The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. Kantei, Tokyo, Japan. November 13, 2009.

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-and-prime-minister-yukio-hatoyama-japan-joint-press->

REMARKS BY PRESIDENT OBAMA, PRIME MINISTER FREDRIK REINFELDT OF SWEDEN, EUROPEAN COMMISSION PRESIDENT JOSÉ MANUEL BARROSO, AND EUROPEAN COUNCIL HIGH REPRESENTATIVE JAVIER SOLANA AFTER MEETING

The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. Cabinet Room. November 3, 2009.

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-obama-swedish-prime-minister-reinfeldt-european-commission-presid>

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT AT THE SIGNING OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010

The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. East Room. October 28, 2009.

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-signing-national-defense-authorization-act-fiscal-year-2010>

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT BEFORE MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD CO-CHAIRMEN AND SENIOR LEADERSHIP OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. Cabinet Room. October 28, 2009.

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-meeting-with-presidents-intelligence-advisory-board-co-chairmen-a>

REMARKS BY VICE PRESIDENT BIDEN ON AMERICA CENTRAL EUROPE AND A PARTNERSHIP FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

The White House. Office of the Vice President. Central University Library, Bucharest, Romania. October 22, 2009.

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-vice-president-biden-america-central-europe-and-a-partnership-21st-century>

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT TO JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCE STAFF MEMBERS

The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. Joint Terrorism Task Force Headquarters New York, New York. October 20, 2009.

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-joint-terrorism-task-force-staff-members>

REMARKS BY PRESIDENT OBAMA AND PRIME MINISTER MALIKI OF IRAQ AFTER MEETING

The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. Oval Office. October 20, 2009.

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-maliki-iraq-after-meeting>

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT ON WINNING THE NOBEL PEACE PRIZE

The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. Rose Garden. October 9, 2009.

http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-on-Winning-the-Nobel-Peace-Prize

STATEMENTS:

STATEMENT FROM WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY ROBERT GIBBS ON TODAY'S IAEA VOTE

The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. November 27, 2009.

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/statement-white-house-press-secretary-robert-gibbs-todays-iaea-vote>

PRESIDENT TO ATTEND COPENHAGEN CLIMATE TALKS

The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. November 25, 2009.

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/president-attend-copenhagen-climate-talks>

Administration Announces U.S. Emission Target for Copenhagen.

JOINT STATEMENT BETWEEN PRIME MINISTER DR. SINGH AND PRESIDENT OBAMA

The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. November 24, 2009.

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/joint-statement-between-prime-minister-dr-singh-and-president-obama>

FACT SHEETS: U.S. - INDIAN COOPERATION

The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. November 24, 2009.

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/fact-sheets-us-indian-cooperation>

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY ON THE ELECTION OF A NEW EUROPEAN COUNCIL PRESIDENT AND HIGH REPRESENTATIVE

The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. November 19, 2009.

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/statement-press-secretary-election-a-new-european-council-president-and-high-repres>

JOINT PRESS STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT OBAMA AND PRESIDENT HU OF CHINA

The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. Great Hall, Beijing, China. November 17, 2009.

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/joint-press-statement-president-obama-and-president-hu-china>

STATEMENTS BY PRESIDENT OBAMA AND PRESIDENT MEDVEDEV OF RUSSIA AFTER BILATERAL MEETING

The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. Shangri-La Hotel, Singapore. November 15, 2009.

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/statements-president-obama-and-president-medvedev-russia-after-bilateral-meeting>

UNITED STATES-JAPAN JOINT STATEMENT TOWARD A WORLD WITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. November 13, 2009.

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/united-states-japan-joint-statement-toward-a-world-without-nuclear-weapons>

Department of State**PRESS CONFERENCE AT U.S. EMBASSY KABUL**

By **Hillary Rodham Clinton**, Secretary of State. Kabul, Afghanistan. November 19, 2009.

<http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/11/132150.htm>

Press conference held on President Karzai's Inauguration Day.

REMARKS AT THE BRANDENBURG GATE CELEBRATION

By **Hillary Rodham Clinton**, Secretary of State. Brandenburg Gate, Berlin, Germany. November 9, 2009.

<http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/11/131724.htm>

BACKGROUND BRIEFING WITH SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS ON IAEA BOARD OF GOVERNORS' RESOLUTION ON IRAN

Via Teleconference. Washington DC. November 27, 2009.

<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/nov/132493.htm>

BRIEFING BY SPECIAL ENVOY FOR MIDDLE EAST PEACE GEORGE MITCHELL

By George Mitchell, Special Envoy for the Middle East Peace. Washington, DC. November 25, 2009.

<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/nov/132447.htm>

ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS

By Ian Kelly, Department Spokesman. Daily Press Briefing. Washington, DC. November 25, 2009.

<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2009/nov/132433.htm>

Congress

TORA BORA REVISITED: HOW WE FAILED TO GET BIN LADEN AND WHY IT MATTERS TODAY

A Report To Members OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE. By John F. Kerry, Chairman. ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION. November 30, 2009. 49 pages.

http://foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Tora_Bora_Report.pdf

CONFRONTING AL-QAEDA: UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT IN AFGHANISTAN AND BEYOND

By Senator Kerry. HEARING before the Committee On Foreign Relations, United States Senate. October 7, 2009. 3 pages.

<http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2009/KerryStatement091007p.pdf>

"(...)defeating terrorist networks is more than just killing terrorists and disrupting their operations. In many ways, our efforts to combat terrorism can best be thought of as a global counterinsurgency campaign, where deterring tomorrow's terrorists is every bit as important as killing or disrupting today's. At its core, this is a battle against the extremists, for the future of people's minds in many different parts of the world. And success will require a comprehensive strategy to address the root causes of terrorism. We must delegitimize terrorists and, obviously, win over the hearts and the minds of those in the Muslim world."

Congressional Research Service Reports for Congress

TERRORISM INFORMATION SHARING AND THE NATIONWIDE SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORT INITIATIVE: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS

By Mark A. Randol, Specialist in Domestic Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism. Congressional Research Service. November 5, 2009. 26 pages.

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/132242.pdf>

The 2004 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission) cited breakdowns in information sharing and the failure to fuse pertinent intelligence as key factors in the failure to prevent the 9/11 attacks. Efforts have been undertaken since 2001 to tackle these issues. This report describes the NSI, the

rationale for the sharing of terrorism-related SARs, and how the NSI seeks to achieve this objective. It examines the privacy and civil liberties concerns raised by the initiative and identifies other oversight issues for Congress.

U.S. NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH INDIA: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS

By Paul K. Kerr, Analyst in Nonproliferation. Congressional Research Service. November 5, 2009. 47 pages.

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/132243.pdf>

Several steps remain before U.S. companies can start nuclear trade with India. They will likely be very reluctant to engage in nuclear trade with India if the government does not become party to the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, which has not yet entered into force. India also is reportedly insisting that New Delhi and Washington conclude an agreement on a reprocessing facility in India before New Delhi signs contracts with U.S. nuclear firms.

AFGHANISTAN: POLITICS, ELECTIONS, AND GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE

By Kenneth Katzman, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs. Congressional Research Service. November 2, 2009. 30 pages.

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/132246.pdf>

The election issue has been a factor in a September-November 2009 Administration review of strategy. Under an FY2009 supplemental appropriation, the Administration developed, by September 23, 2009, "metrics" by which to judge progress in Afghanistan, including the performance and legitimacy of the Afghan government and its efforts to curb official corruption.

JORDAN: BACKGROUND AND U.S. RELATIONS

By Jeremy M. Sharp, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs. Congressional Research Service. October 30, 2009. 30 pages.

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/132248.pdf>

This report provides an overview of Jordanian politics and current issues in U.S.-Jordanian relations. It provides a brief discussion of Jordan's government and economy and of its cooperation in promoting Arab-Israeli peace and other U.S. policy objectives in the Middle East.

AMENDMENTS TO THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT (FISA) SET TO EXPIRE IN 2009

By Anna C. Henning, Edward C. Liu, Legislative Attorneys. Congressional Research Service. October 29, 2009. 18 pages.

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/132296.pdf>

Three amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) are set to expire (sunset) on December 31, 2009. They expanded the scope of federal intelligence-gathering authority following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Although these provisions are set to sunset on December 31, 2009, grandfather clauses permit them to remain effective with respect to investigations that began, or potential offenses that took place, before the sunset date.

IRAQ: POST-SADDAM GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY

By Kenneth Katzman, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs. Congressional Research Service. October 28, 2009. 59 pages.

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/132300.pdf>

Mounting U.S. casualties and financial costs --without clear movement toward national political reconciliation --stimulated debate within the 110th Congress over whether a stable Iraq could ever be achieved, and at what cost. With an apparent consensus within the Administration to wind down the U.S. combat in Iraq, U.S. economic and security aid to Iraq has been reduced since FY2008. But some U.S. officials believe that a U.S. military presence might be needed beyond 2011 to ensure further political progress and produce a unified, democratic Iraq that can govern and defend itself and is an ally in the war on terror.

THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND PROPOSED U.S. NUCLEAR COOPERATION

By Christopher M. Blanchard, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs, Paul K. Kerr, Analyst in Nonproliferation. Congressional Research Service. October 28, 2009. 21 pages.

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/132298.pdf>

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has embarked on a program to build civilian nuclear power plants and is seeking cooperation and technical assistance from the United States and others. This report provides background information on the UAE nuclear program, reviews developments to date, analyzes proposed nuclear cooperation with the United States, and discusses relevant legislative proposals and options.

TANZANIA: BACKGROUND AND CURRENT CONDITIONS

By Ted Dagne, Specialist in African Affairs. Congressional Research Service. October 27, 2009. 8 pages.

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/132304.pdf>

Tanzania, an important U.S. ally in Africa, is a stable and important regional actor. There has been a gradual increase in political pluralism, but Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), the ruling party, remains dominant in government and parliament. Tanzania's current president, Jakaya Kikwete, won 80.3% of the votes cast in the December 2005 presidential election. The country continues its pattern of steady real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth and has a low and stable inflation rate.

ZIMBABWE: THE POWER SHARING AGREEMENT AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY

By Lauren Ploch, Analyst in African Affairs. Congressional Research Service. October 27, 2009. 39 pages.

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/132303.pdf>

After almost a year of uncertainty following Zimbabwe's March 2008 elections, a new government had been established after a power-sharing agreement signed in an effort to resolve the political standoff resulting from these flawed elections. But many remain skeptical that true power sharing exists within the coalition government. In 2005, former U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice labeled Zimbabwe an "outpost of

tyranny,” and Bush Administration officials accused Mugabe's party of rigging the 2008 election and orchestrating political violence. President Barack Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton have been similarly critical of Mugabe's rule. The United States has enforced targeted sanctions against top Zimbabwe officials and associates since 2002 and Congress has expressed its opposition to the government's undemocratic policies in the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of 2001 and subsequent legislation.

THE U.S. SECRET SERVICE: AN EXAMINATION AND ANALYSIS OF ITS EVOLVING MISSIONS

By Shawn Reese, Analyst in Emergency Management and Homeland Security Policy. Congressional Research Service. October 23, 2009. 22 pages.

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/132308.pdf>

The U.S. Secret Service has two missions, criminal investigations and protection. In March 2003, it was transferred from the Department of the Treasury to the Department of Homeland Security as a distinct entity. During an April 2008 hearing on the FY2009 budget request for the U.S. Secret Service, Members of Congress raised questions related to the missions and organizational location of the Service. Are its two missions compatible and how should they be prioritized? Is the Department of Homeland Security the most appropriate organizational and administrative location for the Secret Service? Additionally, there has been increased interest in the Service due to the recent inaugural security operations and the protection of President Barack Obama. Some may contend that these and other questions call for renewed attention given the recent increase in demand for the Service's protection function and the advent of new technology used in financial crimes.

EUROPEAN UNION ENLARGEMENT: A STATUS REPORT ON TURKEY'S ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS

By Vincent Morelli, Section Research Manager, Carol Migdalovitz, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs. Congressional Research Service. October 8, 2009. 16 pages.

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/132253.pdf>

October 2009 marks the fourth anniversary of the European Union's decision to proceed with formal negotiations with Turkey toward full membership in the Union. The U.S. Congress has long been supportive of Turkey's eventual membership in the European Union and President Obama, in his visit to Ankara in the spring, reiterated the U.S. government's continued support for Turkey's membership.

IRAN SANCTIONS

By Kenneth Katzman. Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs. Congressional Research Service. October 8, 2009. 27 pages.

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/132256.pdf>

Iran is subject to a wide range of U.S. sanctions, restricting trade with, investment, and U.S. foreign aid to Iran, and requiring the United States to vote against international lending to Iran. U.S. officials have identified Iran's energy sector as a key Iranian vulnerability because Iran's government revenues are approximately 80% dependent on oil revenues and in need of substantial foreign investment. While international pressure

on Iran to curb its nuclear program has increased the hesitation of many major foreign firms to invest in Iran's energy sector, some firms continue to see opportunity in Iran. This particularly appears to be the case for companies in Asia. Some in Congress express concern about the reticence of U.S. allies, of Russia, and of China, to impose U.N. sanctions that would target Iran's civilian economy. In an attempt to strengthen U.S. leverage with its allies to back such international sanctions, several bills in the 111th Congress would add U.S. sanctions on Iran. However, some experts see such legislation as angering Europe and thereby reducing European cooperation with the United States on Iran, or as potentially backfiring by strengthening the political control exercised by Iran's leaders.

IRAQ: REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES AND U.S. POLICY

By Christopher M. Blanchard, Kenneth Katzman, Carol Migdalovitz, Jeremy M. Sharp
Specialists in Middle Eastern Affairs. Congressional Research Service. October 6, 2009.
39 pages.

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/132250.pdf>

Iraq's neighbors have influenced events in Iraq since the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime in 2003, and developments in Iraq have had political, economic, and security implications for Iraq's neighbors and the broader Middle East. This report provides information about the current perspectives and policies of Iraq's neighbors; analyzes potential regional responses to renewed violence and longer-term stabilization efforts; discusses shared concerns and U.S. long-term regional interests; and reviews U.S. policy options for responding to various contingencies.

Key U.S. Government Reports

THE CLOCK IS TICKING: A PROGRESS REPORT ON AMERICA'S PREPAREDNESS TO PREVENT WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROLIFERATION AND TERRORISM

Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism. October 21, 2009. 27 pages.

<http://www.preventwmd.gov/static/docs/report/WMDRpt10-20Final.pdf>

The United States is failing to address its most urgent threat, biological proliferation and terrorism, concludes the report. The Commission also felt the Obama Administration has given appropriate high-level attention to the nuclear threat but noted the challenges loom large. "The clock is ticking," said Commission Chairman and former Senator Bob Graham. "The United States has taken action, but we have not kept pace with those who would do us, or the world community, harm. The terrorists are flexible and increasingly capable. The executive branch, the legislative branch, and even the American people must do more."

THINK TANKS AND RESEARCH CENTERS:

The opinions expressed in these publications do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Government

AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN

THE MAGAI™ CONSTRUCT AND THE NORTHERN DISTRIBUTION NETWORK

A Report of the CSIS Project on the Northern Distribution Network in Afghanistan. By Stephen Benson. Center for Strategic and International Studies. November 16, 2009. 21 pages.

http://csis.org/files/publication/091110_Benson_MAGAI_Web.pdf

The United States is pouring massive resources and risking precious lives of its soldiers in its efforts to stabilize Afghanistan, a part of the world most Americans could not identify on a map before 9/11. President Barack Obama has already increased the U.S. force presence considerably and is deliberating further increases in what may be the most portentous decision of his presidency. But his administration, as well as its predecessor, undercuts the rationale for engagement in this remote barren land by emphasizing only the prevention of future and perhaps catastrophic terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland. As this paper argues, there is a deeper and broader strategic argument for U.S. engagement, shaped by longstanding global forces illuminated in a novel manner by the MAGAI™ Construct.

THE TWO-FRONT WAR

By Frederick W. Kagan. The Weekly Standard. American Enterprise Institute. November 9, 2009.

<http://www.aei.org/article/101250>

A network of militant Islamist groups stretches from India to the Iranian border, from the Hindu Kush to the Indian Ocean. These groups include Pashtuns and Punjabis, Arabs and Uzbeks and more. They have no common leader, vision, hierarchy, or goal. But they do agree on a few key points: any government not based on their interpretation of Islam is illegitimate and apostate; anyone who participates in or obeys such a government is not a Muslim and is therefore liable to be killed; Muslims must be “liberated” from oppressive regimes such as Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan; and the United States and its allies are the principal sources of support for these unjust and apostate regimes and must be defeated or destroyed.

AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES: SHAPING HOST COUNTRY FORCES AS PART OF ARMED NATION BUILDING

By Anthony H. Cordesman. Center for Strategic and International Studies. November 4, 2009. 92 pages.

http://csis.org/files/publication/091104_ansf_review_draft.pdf

Afghanistan and Iraq have both shown that the United States must look far beyond the normal definition of counterinsurgency to determine how it can conduct armed nation building as a critical element of hybrid warfare. This requires an integrated civil-military effort in which providing lasting security for the population, and economic and political stability, will often be far more important than success in tactical engagements with enemy forces. It also requires the US to understand that important as its traditional allies are, the key ally will be the host country and not simply its government but its population.

PAKISTAN'S NEW GENERATION OF TERRORISTS

By Jayshree Bajoria. Council on Foreign Relations. October 26, 2009.

http://www.cfr.org/bios/13611/jayshree_bajoria.html

As an increasing number of suicide attacks rock Pakistan's major cities, concerns for the country's security are rising. In recent years, many new terrorist groups have emerged, several existing groups have reconstituted themselves, and a new crop of militants has emerged, more violent and less conducive to political solutions than their predecessors. Pakistani authorities have long had ties to militant groups based on their soil that largely focused their efforts in Afghanistan and India. But with Pakistan joining the United States as an ally in its "war on terrorism" since 9/11, experts say Islamabad has seen harsh blowback on its policy of backing militants operating abroad. Hillary Clinton said deteriorating security in nuclear-armed Pakistan "poses a mortal threat" to the United States and the world.

PAKISTAN: COUNTERING MILITANCY IN FATA

International Crisis Group. October 21, 2009. 39 pages.

http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/south_asia/178_pakistan_countering_militancy_in_fata.pdf

According to the report, the military operation in South Waziristan is unlikely to succeed in curbing the spread of religious militancy in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), unless the Pakistan government implements political reforms in that part of the country. Pakistani Taliban groups have gained significant power in the tribal agencies, seven administrative districts bordering on Afghanistan. While state institutions in FATA are increasingly dysfunctional, the militants have dismantled or assumed control of an already fragile tribal structure.

AFGHANISTAN 2011: THREE SCENARIOS

By Andrew Exum. Center for a New American Security. October 20, 2009. 4 pages.

[http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS%20Policy%20Brief%20-%20Afghanistan%202011%20-%203%20Scenarios%20Nov%202009%20\(2\).pdf](http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS%20Policy%20Brief%20-%20Afghanistan%202011%20-%203%20Scenarios%20Nov%202009%20(2).pdf)

On March 27, 2009, the Obama administration released its new policy and strategic goals for Afghanistan amidst much fanfare. Just six months later, though, the administration has mounted yet another review of U.S. policy and strategy --the fifth high-level review by the U.S. government in the past 12 months. Two things happened to spur this review. This brief, authored by a CNAS Fellow and U.S. Afghanistan policy expert, is meant to serve as a guide for strategic Afghanistan policy planning by laying out the worst, most likely, and best-case scenario for what the country might look like in 24 months, and how U.S. policy might make each scenario more or less likely. Although all three scenarios involve risks, an Afghanistan at peace with itself and its neighbors remains a possibility.

THE POLITICS OF AID: CONTROVERSY SURROUNDS THE PAKISTAN AID BILL

By Karin von Hippel, Shiza Shahid. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). October 19, 2009.

<http://csis.org/publication/politics-aid-controversy-surrounds-pakistan-aid-bill>

The recent controversy created by the passing of the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009, informally known as Kerry-Lugar, provides a window into the challenges surrounding attempts to forge a new relationship with the people and government of Pakistan. The bill, which triples U.S. nonmilitary assistance to Pakistan from \$400 million to \$1.5 billion annually for the next five years, has been largely criticized in Pakistan, with the press and political parties claiming that it is “less an assistance program than a treaty of surrender.”

PAKISTAN’S EDUCATION SYSTEM AND LINKS TO EXTREMISM

By Jayshree Bajoria. Council on Foreign Relations. October 7, 2009.

http://www.cfr.org/publication/20364/pakistans_education_system_and_links_to_extremism.html?breadcrumb=%2Fpublication%2Fby_type%2Fbackgrounder

Pakistan's poor education system has increasingly become a matter of international concern. Lack of access to quality education, which in turn limits economic opportunity, makes young Pakistanis targets for extremist groups, some experts say. In August 2009, chief counterterrorism adviser to the White House John Brennan, summing up a concern held by many U.S. terrorism experts, said extremist groups in Pakistan have exploited this weakness.

ESCAPING THE “GRAVEYARD OF EMPIRES”: A STRATEGY TO EXIT AFGHANISTAN

By Malou Innocent, Ten Galen Carpenter. CATO Institute. September 2009. 30 pages.

<http://www.cato.org/pubs/wtpapers/escaping-graveyard-empires-strategy-exit-afghanistan.pdf>

Given the nature of the conflict in Afghanistan, a definitive, conventional “victory” is not a realistic option. Denying a sanctuary to terrorists who seek to attack the United States does not require Washington to pacify the entire country, eradicate its opium fields, or sustain a long-term military presence in Central Asia. Afghanistan serves as the crossroads of Central Asia. Although it has endured successive waves of invaders during its history, no occupying power has ever successfully conquered it. There’s a reason why it has been described as the “graveyard of empires,” and unless America scales down its objectives, it risks meeting a similar fate. Washington needs to narrow its objectives to three critical tasks: Security; Intelligence and Regional Relations; Drugs.

ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

THE DAY AFTER ... IN JERUSALEM: A STRATEGIC PLANNING EXERCISE ON THE PATH TO ACHIEVING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

By Roger C. Molander, David Aaron, Robert E. Hunter, Martin C. Libicki, Douglas Shontz, Peter A. Wilson. RAND Corporation. November 6, 2009. 52 pages.

http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/2009/RAND_CF271.pdf

The RAND Center for Middle East Public Policy conducted a series of exercises to help policymakers in the new U.S. administration more effectively address the challenges of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in particular, as a key component of the broader effort to secure stability in the Middle East. The exercises illuminated: key security and other challenges in Arab-Israeli (and related Middle East) relationships; derivative linkages and threats to U.S. regional and international security

interests; alternative strategies the new administration could pursue in addressing the Israeli-Palestinian problem and other regional issues.

ASIA

HARD LESSONS: NAVIGATING NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE DPRK

By Abraham M. Denmark, Zachary M. Hosford, and Michael J. Zubrow. Center for a New American Security. November 9, 2009. 36 pages.

http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/DenmarkHosfordZubrow_DPRKLessonsLearned_Nov09.pdf

The report is meant to help current and future policymakers who will engage with North Korean officials navigate the pitfalls of past negotiations and forge a credible path toward de-nuclearization. Based on interviews with over 50, high-level current and former American and South Korean government officials, politicians, academics, and journalists, the authors summarize eight obstacles faced in past negotiations and recommend eight new strategies and tactics for addressing them.

OUT OF THE COLD: BURMA AND U.S. TAKE TENTATIVE STEPS

By David I. Steinberg. YaleGlobal. November 4, 2009.

<http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/out-cold-burma-and-us-take-tentative-steps>

Ever since Burma declared martial law in 1988, relations between it and the U.S. have been strained. But as Burma expert David Steinberg writes, with the visit this week by Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell as well as a recent trip by Virginia Senator Jim Webb there are signs of a thaw. Still, such developments only suggest tentative steps in normalizing relations between the two countries, he says.

MANAGING UNMET EXPECTATIONS IN THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE

By Michael Finnegan. NBR Special Report #17. National Bureau of Asian Research. November 2009. 44 pages.

<http://www.nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/SR17.pdf>

The report examines the U.S.-Japan alliance to answer three related questions: Is the alliance meeting the mutual expectations of the partners? If not, what are the potential consequences? Given the stakes involved, what are the policy implications for the alliance?

CHINA

THE THREE REAFFIRMS: SUGGESTED AGENDA FOR PRESIDENT OBAMA'S VISIT TO CHINA

By Dean Cheng. The Heritage Foundation. November 13, 2009.

<http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/wm2697.cfm>

President Obama's visit to Asia will take him on his first official visit to the People's Republic of China (PRC). Advance word is that the President intends to confer with PRC President Hu Jintao on three main subjects: 1-- Pushing China to help with the ongoing global economic crisis; 2-- Pushing China to be a more active participant in efforts to

curtail global warming; 3-- and Pushing China to be a more direct participant in efforts to constrain nuclear proliferation. While all of these issues have gained a great deal of publicity, the prospect of any progress on them is greatly exaggerated.

PRESIDENT OBAMA HAS A FULL PLATE IN FIRST VISIT TO CHINA

By Derek Scissors. The Heritage Foundation. November 12, 2009.

<http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/wm2696.cfm>

During his imminent visit to Asia, President Obama will stop in both Shanghai and Beijing. In the past, the benefits of the Sino-American economic relationship acted as a check against political disagreements. Unfortunately, this trip will see substantial and possibly growing economic tension.

AN AWKWARD DANCE: CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES

By Eswar Prasad, Grace Gu. The Brookings Institution. November 11, 2009. 20 pages.

http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/rc/articles/2009/1111_us_china_prasad/2009_1111_us_china_prasad.pdf

While the economic entanglements between the U.S. and China have increased over the last decade, so has the tension. With President Obama visiting China, Brookings expert Eswar Prasad and Grace Gu of Cornell University discuss the tightening embrace between the two countries -- in terms of flows of goods and services, financial capital and people --and the implications.

CAN PRESIDENT OBAMA PULL A CAIRO-SPEECH MOMENT IN CHINA?

By Cheng Li, Jordan Lee. The Brookings Institution. November 9, 2009.

http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/1109_obama_china_li.aspx

President Barack Obama's maiden trip to China has been his first face-to-face opportunity to shape U.S.-China relations. Cheng Li and Jordan Lee examine new openings for President Obama to press Beijing on harder questions and the fine line he will have to walk between respect for China and pulling all his punches, while reflecting candidly on American ideals.

CYBER AFFAIRS

SIGNIFICANT CYBER EVENTS SINCE 2006

By James Andrew Lewis. CSIS. November 9, 2009. 4 pages.

http://csis.org/files/publication/091109_cyber_events_since_2006.pdf

This list is a work in progress that we update as new incidents come to light. If you have suggestions for additions, send them to techpolicy@csis.org. Significance is in the eye of the beholder, but we focus on successful attacks on government agencies, defense and high tech companies, or economic crimes with losses of more than a million dollars.

CYBERSPACE AND THE "FIRST BATTLE" IN 21ST-CENTURY WAR

By Robert A. Miller, Daniel T. Kuehl. National Defense University. September 2009. 6 pages.

<http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/dh/DH68.pdf>

Wars often start well before main forces engage. The first battle in the 21st century may well be in cyberspace. Coordinated cyber attacks designed to shape the larger battlespace and influence a wide range of forces and levers of power may become the key feature of the next war. In the future, cyber attacks may be combined with other means to inflict paralyzing damage to a nation's critical infrastructure as well as psychological operations designed to create fear, uncertainty, and doubt, a concept we refer to as infrastructure and information operations. The cyber sphere itself is, of course, a critical warfighting domain that hosts countless information infrastructures, but the rise of network-based control systems in areas as diverse as the power grid and logistics has widened the threat posed by network attacks on opposing infrastructures. According to the author and given the increasing dependence of the U.S. military and society on critical infrastructures, this cyber-based first battle is one that the U.S. cannot afford to lose. And yet it might.

CYBERDETERRENCE AND CYBERWAR

By Martin C. Libicki. RAND Corporation. October 8, 2009. 240 pages.

http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG877.pdf

The protection of cyberspace, the information medium, has become a vital national interest because of its importance both to the economy and to military power. An attacker may tamper with networks to steal information for the money or to disrupt operations. Future wars are likely to be carried out, in part or perhaps entirely, in cyberspace, says the report.

DEFENSE

MOVE TO HASTILY RETIRE LEGACY FIGHTER AIRCRAFT PUTS AIR SOVEREIGNTY AT RISK

By Mackenzie Eaglen. The Heritage Foundation. November 16, 2009.

<http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/wm2699.cfm>

Today, the American military's air superiority is at greater risk than any time since World War II. With two major ground wars consuming America's military, it is easy for many to overlook the current contributions from U.S. air and naval forces. Unfortunately, it is more tempting for policymakers to use high-profile U.S. Air Force and Navy programs as billpayers for ground forces' priorities instead of advocating for more resources in defense and a higher topline budget, both of which would maintain America's air superiority while funding troops on the ground. This year, the President's fiscal year (FY) 2010 defense budget proposed eliminating some major Air Force programs. These program cuts would harm homeland defense efforts and expose the nation to greater security risks.

TO BUILD RESILIENCE: LEADER INFLUENCE ON MENTAL HARDINESS

By Paul T. Bartone, Charles L. Barry, and Robert E. Armstrong. National Defense University. November 2009. 8 pages.

<http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/dh/DH69.pdf>

The military profession is inherently stressful, can lead to a range of health problems and performance decrements even among leaders. This paper focuses attention on mental

hardiness, an important pathway to resilience. Research over the past 25 years has confirmed that psychological hardiness is a key stress-resilience factor. People who show high levels of psychological hardiness exhibit greater commitment, control, and acceptance of challenge. The report begins with an essential first step: clarifying the major stress factors that are salient in modern military operations. Next, it gives a brief summary of the theory and research behind the hardiness construct. Finally, it provides a number of suggestions for how to increase hardiness and stress resilience in organizations, primarily through leader actions and policies. By setting the conditions that increase mental hardiness, leaders at all levels can enhance human health and performance, while preventing many stress-related problems before they occur.

SCHOOLS FOR STRATEGY: TEACHING STRATEGY FOR 21st CENTURY CONFLICT

By Dr. Colin S. Gray. Strategic Studies Institute. U.S. Army War College. October 28, 2009. 71 pages.

<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=947>

All would-be strategists would benefit by some formal education. However, for education in strategy to be well-directed, it needs to rest upon sound assumptions concerning the eternal nature yet ever shifting character, meaning, and function of strategy, as well as the range of behaviors required for effective strategic performance. The author emphasizes the necessity for strategic education to help develop the strategic approach, the way of thinking that can solve or illuminate strategic problems. He advises that such education should not strive for a spurious relevance by presenting a military variant of current affairs. The author believes that the strategist will perform better in today's world if he has mastered and can employ strategy's general theory.

STATES OF CONFLICT: AN UPDATE

By Jason Campbell, Michael O'Hanlon, Jeremy Shapiro. The Brookings Institution. October 7, 2009.

http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/1007_afghanistan_iraq_pakistan_ohanlon.aspx

The authors' latest quarterly chart has, for the first time, data on three of the four countries along what might be called the "axis of anxiety" stretching from Iraq to Iran to Afghanistan to Pakistan.

HOW TO MEASURE THE WAR

By Jason Campbell, Michael O'Hanlon, Jeremy Shapiro. The Brookings Institution. October 1, 2009. 17 pages.

http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/rc/articles/2009/10_afghanistan_iraq_campbell/10_afghanistan_iraq_campbell.pdf

How to tell if a counterinsurgency campaign is being won? Sizing the force correctly for a stabilization mission is a key ingredient-- and it has been the subject of much discussion in the modern American debate. But in fact, there is no exact formula for sizing forces. To know if we are being successful, we must also track and study results on the ground. In conventional warfare, identifying the momentum of battle is a fairly straightforward undertaking. But counterinsurgency and stabilization operations --like the ones in Iraq and Afghanistan-- are different, and more complex. They also appear to

be the future of warfare. How do we measure progress in such situations? This question is crucially important. Only by tracking progress can we know whether a strategy is working. And only by examining a range of indicators can we determine how to adjust a strategy that may require improvement.

A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO IMPROVING U.S. SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE EFFORTS

By Lieutenant Colonel Theresa Baginski, et al. Strategic Studies Institute. U.S. Army War College. September 25, 2009. 62 pages.

<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=942>

Security Force Assistance (SFA) is analyzed, and some specific recommendations designed to improve U.S. performance are provided. While SFA may be a new term, the activities themselves are familiar ones related to how the Department of Defense works to train, advise, and assist foreign partners' security establishments to accomplish common objectives. The United States has demonstrated serious SFA deficiencies in recent years. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has noted, the U.S. is likely to remain actively and broadly engaged in SFA for many years to come. The need for comprehensive improvement encompasses DoD military and civilian efforts and requires thoughtful integration with broader whole of government approaches.

IRAN

IRAN'S NUCLEAR NEGOTIATIONS AND THE WEST

By Fariborz Ghadar. Critical Questions. CSIS. November 12, 2009.

<http://csis.org/publication/iran%E2%80%99s-nuclear-negotiations-and-west>

During the past seven years of negotiations between the Western powers and Iran, Iran has persistently claimed that its uranium enrichment and heavy water reactor facilities are aimed at producing nuclear fuel for power generation. The Western powers, however, suspect that the program is intended to develop nuclear weapons.

IRAQ

IRAQ: CREATING A STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

By Anthony H. Cordesman, Elena Derby, Adam Mausner. CSIS. October 28, 2009. 188 pages.

http://csis.org/files/publication/091028_IraqStratPartner_0.pdf

The recent bombings in Iraq have shown that the Iraq War is scarcely over. The insurgency is still capable of major bombings and efforts to renew ethnic and sectarian conflict. Iraq faces other internal challenges like tensions between Arabs and Kurds, and is years away from achieving lasting security and stability. If Iraq and the United States are to win the war in any meaningful and lasting sense, they must translate the Strategic Agreement they signed in November 2008 into a lasting and functional strategic partnership. In the process, the U.S. must put Iraq firmly in the lead, but sustain the kind of aid and advice that will help Iraq make further progress in political accommodation, the quality of governance, economic development, and security.

MUSLIM WORLD

THE OPPORTUNITY OF THE OBAMA ERA: CAN CIVIL SOCIETY HELP BRIDGE DIVIDES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND A DIVERSE MUSLIM WORLD?

By Hady Amr. The Brookings Institution. Brookings Doha Center. November 2009. 104 pages.

http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/rc/papers/2009/11_civil_society_amr/11_civil_society_amr.pdf

Hady Amr presents research on efforts to bridge the gap between the United States and a diverse Muslim world. In a wide survey of various initiatives, many of which developed post-9/11, Amr evaluates the level of success that different programs have experienced so far and offers several recommendations on ways civil society can be the most effective in bringing people together for meaningful dialogue and progress.

NOBEL PRIZE

OBAMA AND THE NOBEL PEACE PRIZE

By Hady Amr, Steven W. Barnes. The Brookings Institution. October 12, 2009.

http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/1012_obama_peace_prize_amr.aspx

President Barack Obama's 2009 Nobel Peace Prize immediately triggered strong reactions worldwide, particularly highlighting the major challenges Obama faces in Muslim-majority states and communities, from the Mideast peace process, to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Yet the Prize also presents President Obama a key opportunity to build on his recent efforts to foster dialogue between America and Muslims around the globe.

OSLO'S DECISION IS SHORTSIGHTED

By James Jay Carafano. The Heritage Foundation. October 9, 2009.

<http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed100909e.cfm>

According to the author, the Nobel Committee awarded the prize on the basis of hope for what he'll do in the future, rather than on his past achievements. Waking up to a Nobel Peace Prize may not have been what President Obama wanted. This report explains why.

NUCLEAR

SECURING VULNERABLE NUCLEAR MATERIALS: MEETING THE GLOBAL CHALLENGE

By Kenneth N. Luongo. The Stanley Foundation. November 2009. 12 pages.

http://www.stanleyfdn.org/publications/pab/Luongo_PAB1109.pdf

Better control of vulnerable nuclear materials is a pressing worldwide concern. Effective international cooperation is essential, not only to thwart potential terrorism but to meet the Obama administration's goal of securing all vulnerable nuclear materials within four years and to create the conditions necessary for eventual nuclear disarmament. Noted specialist and former senior Energy Department official Kenneth N. Luongo explains the complicated context of existing international commitments, sovereignty concerns,

current initiatives, and major trends by region. He highlights the need for a greater global consensus if there is to be any hope of meeting --or approaching-- the president's four-year goal. In this brief, Luongo offers a specific policy agenda and road map to meet this critical global security objective.

OBSTACLES TO NEGOTIATING A NEW START AGREEMENT

By Kingston Reif. Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. October 30, 2009.

http://www.armscontrolcenter.org/policy/nuclearweapons/articles/103009_obstacles_new_start/

In May 2009, the United States and Russia began formal negotiations on a follow-on agreement to replace START I, which expires in December 2009. The two sides hope to complete negotiations by the end of this year, with a Senate vote on ratification expected early next year. This timeline could get pushed back, however, if the two sides are unable to resolve their differences on a number of key issues. Based on news reports, conversations with Russian and American experts, and discussions with senior U.S. officials, numerous problems remain.

NUCLEAR POWER WITHOUT NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION?

By Scott D. Sagan, Steven E. Miller. Center for International Security and Cooperation. Fall 2009. 12 pages.

http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22659/Sagan_Nuclear_power_without_nuclear_proliferation.pdf

In this introductory essay, the authors aim first to demonstrate why the question of which states will develop nuclear power in the future matters for global security. Second, they introduce major themes addressed by the authors in both volumes, and explain why the expansion of nuclear power, the future of nuclear weapons disarmament, and the future of the NPT and related parts of the nuclear control regime are so intertwined. Finally, they conclude with some observations about what is new and what is not new about current global nuclear challenges.

PREVENTIVE ACTION

ENHANCING U.S. PREVENTIVE ACTION

By Paul B. Stares, Micah Zenko. Council on Foreign Relations. Center for Preventive Action. October 2009. 57 pages.

http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Preventive_Action_CSR48.pdf

Few would dispute that preventing conflict, instability, and humanitarian disaster is preferable to confronting these problems after they arise. Preventive measures are generally less expensive than remedial ones. They also allow policymakers to address potential crises before they threaten international stability, U.S. interests, and human lives. Building an effective U.S. government capacity to take preventive action, however, has proved an elusive goal. And the challenges to achieving it have perhaps never been greater. The urgent problems faced by the United States, including wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, nuclear development in Iran and North Korea, and the aftermath of a deep economic crisis, make it difficult for policymakers to focus resources and attention on

potential future threats. But these same urgent challenges also make preventive action more useful.

SUDAN

SEEKING A NEW PATH TO STABILITY IN SUDAN, AND AFRICA

By Johnnie Carson, Stephanie Hanson. Council on Foreign Relations. October 20, 2009.
http://www.cfr.org/publication/20461/new_path_to_stability_in_sudan.html?breadcru mb=%2F

Johnnie Carson, the top State Department official on Africa, says new policy on Sudan stresses the need for progress on Darfur, the North-South peace agreement, and anti-terror efforts.

SUDAN AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT

By Ambassador Richard W. Williamson. The Stanley Foundation. October 2009. 12 pages.

<http://www.stanleyfdn.org/publications/pab/WilliamsonPAB1009.pdf>

Former U.S. presidential special envoy to Sudan Richard Williamson writes that the continuing anemic response of the international community to the “slow motion genocide” in Darfur undermines efforts to give meaning to “Responsibility to Protect”(R2P). While this consequential emerging norm was embraced by more than 175 nations, including the United States, at the 2005 U.N. World Summit, the complexities of the Sudan situation and the politics of the United Nations frustrate even the semblance of actual implementation. Ambassador Williamson stresses that, to be consequential, R2P must be more than another development program and must give meaning to the rhetoric of “Never Again!” He stresses that collective action to stop genocide and mass atrocities remains an enormous challenge for the 21st century. R2P should become an effective instrument to protect the innocent.

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<http://france.usembassy.gov/web-alert.html>

